Enterprise Strategy Group | Getting to the bigger truth.TM
Search

Archive for 2009

Fail Factors – Why Startups Die: The Market of One

Thursday, December 31st, 2009

Small companies with limited resources spend far too much time and effort attempting to “win” marquee accounts way too early – and it often kills them.

Within enterprise technology, society has been built based on misguided perceptions of success, which died the way the Soviet Union did, but are perpetuated in the current climate despite being an almost sure way to death.

VCs have long viewed Wall Street as the bellwether indicator for the success of their portfolio companies.  Wall Street IT has long been considered the best of the best, so if you can sell there, you can sell anywhere.  Wrong.  Stupidly, arrogantly, and ignorantly wrong.

As a result of this continuing fallacy being shoved down the throats of entrepreneurs, companies spend all their time, money, and effort attempting to satisfy a prospect who does not represent the real market.  Instead, they are almost always the exact opposite of the real market.  They are, by their very nature, what we call “corner cases.”

The real market does not have the “best” IT department known to man.  It doesn’t pay top dollar and invest an astronomical proportion of its revenues back into IT technology.  The real market has real IT people – with real problems.  Lehman Brothers had huge pockets and huge egos.  Lehman Brothers, like the Soviet Union, was thought to be invincible.  Oops.

The real market wants a real problem solved – not cold fusion.  It doesn’t care about how you spent all of your last round of financing sleeping in Morgan Stanley’s data center completely re-architecting your solution to meet  specific needs for interplanetary replication.  It wants idiot-proof solutions to the problems smacking it in the face every day, not some pipe dream that will never matter.  The real market doesn’t buy a titanium jaw replacement when it needs a root canal.  Worse, it will suffer the pain until it can’t take it anymore.  The goofy market will have you develop the jaw.  Then just when you think it is going to actually pay you for it, it will instead make you chew for it.

The real market can’t afford science projects.

The real market does not act like a puppeteer to a vendor simply for sadistic sport – to see just how far it can make you jump or how loud it can make you bark.  The real market has no time for that.  The goofy market has plenty.

The goofy market has people, in very senior positions, whose entire role in life is to make you perform unnatural acts just to screw with you.  I swear it’s true.  In the same way psychotic experimentation has occurred throughout history, the modern manifestation have appeared as IT executives in some of these prestigious institutions.  And they don’t just abuse startups – they are horrific abusers of even mainstream vendors.  Power corrupts people.  Power and sociopathic tendencies are a brutal dynamic – so welcome to Big Bank IT.

The false market will wrap you up so tightly in designing a custom thing for its own use, that even if you are successful in taking its money (after two years of never ending abuse), the mass market will not value what you have done.  It will have either already solved the real problems it had by buying from someone else, or decided the problem wasn’t real enough to merit solving.

All your tales of how great it was that you sold $2,000,000 worth of your product to Goldman are as valuable as the reference you get – that’s it.  Even then, it’s fleeting value, as, like the mob, you owe them a favor.

Assuming you can get your VCs to take their heads out of their backsides for a few minutes, you will find that the only way to ever really be successful selling to corner case elephants is to violently limit the amount of investment you are willing to make.  If you truly have something they want and need – fantastic.  They can come to you.  If you are trying to force your way into their world because you were told A: their name is critical for your success or B: they have all the money, so if we can sell to Goldman, then Morgan will buy a billion from us, I can assure you that statistically, you are screwed.

Companies blow up after spending zillions of dollars and years because it takes that to get A DEAL in one of these goofy, pre-internet economy establishments.  They either bleed out or  end up with a product with a market of exactly one. You don’t have much leverage in either case.

Whether from an engineering, sales, or marketing perspective, you are always better off focusing on solving the most myopic problem with the most ubiquitous demand.  Solve the problem 80% of the world is willing to pay to solve, and you have a hyper-market opportunity – even if it’s an “easy” problem.  Solve a wicked hard problem that only a handful of elephants really care about and you will not succeed.

If you are lucky enough to have some magic elixir that Wall Street truly needs, good for you.  Then you can become Sybase, make a pile of money for a while, and then manage yourself to the grave.  Remember Stratus?  Tandem?  If you aren’t broad market, you aren’t going to live forever.  Oracle or Cisco sell tons to Wall  Street – but they aren’t developing their products for Wall Street.  Au contraire, they are so mainstream successful that Wall Street has to buy from them, lest it put itself into a support nightmare.

So the lesson today, kids, is while there is absolute appeal in the glamor and glory of the fantasy of hooking up with Giselle, you have much better odds of succeeding in your true quest if you set your sights on a more attainable target.  You might be a great looking guy, but you are going to be spending a lot of time on self “introspection” while the mainstream masses are frolicking all over the place.  Go forth and frolic.

Happy New Year!

  • Share/Bookmark

Fail Factors – Why Startups Die: Revenue versus Valuation

Tuesday, December 29th, 2009

There are 3 core “legs” a business must stand on to survive, and hopefully, thrive.  They are Sales, Engineering, and Marketing. There are a ton of other important areas within a business, of course, but these stick out as keys to life or death, in my experience.  Rarely does someone fail because of poor facilities management or toilet cleaning or even accounting.  It just doesn’t happen anymore.

Engineering is critical – lest we have nothing to sell or market.  Most technology companies start as engineering exercises and treat sales as secondary – and often treat marketing as evil.  Engineering-dominant companies often have the problem of building a solution to a problem that doesn’t necessarily exist.   More on this later.

Sales is critical – but startups often overinflate the value of revenue.  Don’t mistake my comment – I love revenue.  What I mean is that it is far more important early on to gain knowledge about the market versus revenue from it.  Knowing why the customer buys or doesn’t has much more meaningful leverage points for the business in the future.  Boards and VCs will shoot you for thinking like this, but they are part of the problem (more on this later as well).  If the board isn’t loaded with idiots, they would rather have you figure out what happened last quarter so you can accelerate REAL revenue acquisition.  No one will care that you missed your $1M target last quarter if you can hit $10M two quarters from now.  Getting it right faster is much more valuable in the long run than hitting flawed numbers.

Marketing is perhaps the most misunderstood leg in the stool.  It’s the most underinvested and as such tends to be a place where the mediocre reside.  Marketers have done a poor job in enterprise technology by following instead of leading.

In order for the 3 legged stool to remain stable, all 3 legs have to be growing at the same relative rate.  If one leg grows too fast, the stool will tip over.  If one leg grows too slow, the result is the same.

Think about this:  Engineering is a cost center.  Sure,  you need a product to sell to garner revenue, but that revenue is indirect – or not directly associated with Engineering.  Sure, we praise the engineering team at our sales meeting for giving us great stuff to sell, but who are we kidding?  The sales folks get the credit, the money, and the glory 99% of the time.  No matter what you build, the way that you build it is treated as a cost center.  Cost centers are the first to get squeezed when anything negative happens.

Sales gets the glory because revenue is the easiest means of judging our success.  Rarely do we have brilliantly engineered products that sell themselves – outside of consumer markets, that is.  In “enterprise” technology companies, things have to be sold.  Only when you are a runaway success, or virtual monopoly, can you start “taking orders” instead of selling. Thus, like the president, sales gets too much credit for success and too much blame for failure.  Since $$ is easy to metric, boards and VCs will always push it.

Marketing is nebulous in enterprise technology markets.  It’s a cost center, but it doesn’t produce products.  It can’t normally metric against $$$.  All the problems, none of the glory.  That’s why it’s been easy for CEOs to overlook marketing as an afterthought or for the VP of sales to treat marketing like second class citizens who “can’t sell,” and thus are banished.  Those who can’t, teach, as it were.

The Facts of Business Life in Enterprise Technology:

  1. Engineering is a mandatory investment.  We need something to sell.  It would be great if it’s the best thing ever, but it’s not that important.  What is important is that it solves a legitimate, ubiquitous problem that people will spend money to solve.
  2. Revenue is NOT the most important metric.  Revenue matters a lot – but it’s not the most important.
  3. Valuation is the most important metric.  Valuation is based on a set of enormously unscientific principles, emotion, and feeling.  Revenue, if you have it, plays a role as ONE metric to be applied against the VALUATION MULTIPLIER.

What functional “leg” represents the biggest impact to valuation?  Marketing.  This is a fact.

Until you are an established public company placed into a “bucket” (that you can often never get out of regardless of its applicability), you have the opportunity to enhance your valuation multiplier.  The way to do that is to increase the value of the multiplier. Duh.  Your revenue is your revenue – your earnings your earnings.  Those can go up or down, but neither will have the ability to dramatically increase valuation like the multiplier can.

$1M x a multiple of 10 = a value of $10M bucks.

$1M x a multiple of 100 = a value of $100M bucks.

Same revenue – much different valuations.

See where I’m going with this?  CEOs focus on revenue too heavily early on because it’s what the board (and themselves) uses as the metric for success or failure.  What they should focus on is valuation.  Valuation has a lot more, well, value than just revenue.

EqualLogic was running at about $70M in sales, almost break-even when Dell paid $1.3B clams for them.  Dell’s multiple on revenue is about .5.  That means Dell sells $60B of stuff, and is valued by Wall St. at around $30B.  For every dollar of revenue, Dell gets $.50 of valuation.  If you use earnings instead of revenue, they are valued at around 20x.  That means for every dollar of bottom line earnings, they get a multiplier of 20.

EqualLogic was valued at 200X revenue versus Dell at .5x revenue – or 400 X higher.  Since EqualLogic had no earnings, their multiplier on that metric is infinite.  Infinite versus 20.

At the end of the day, a dollar is a dollar and a Euro a Euro.  How can one be worth so much more than the other?  Marketing. Until you are captured and put into a box by the Wall St. analysts, you have limitless perception boundaries.  It’s not what you are – it’s what people think you represent.  It’s the opportunity for you to possibly do great things – not the things you actually do – that matters.  Why was EqualLogic’s dollar so much more valuable?  Marketing.

Data Domain sold to EMC for $2.4B for doing about $200M in revenue.  12X revenue was Data Domain’s value multiplier.  EMC’s revenue multiplier is about 2.2x (4x larger than Dell’s).  EMC’s earnings multiplier is 35x (2x Dell’s – a dollar really isn’t a dollar apparently).  Data Domain’s earnings multiplier was in the stratosphere, because they didn’t have much.

Why was Data Domain so much more valuable for each dollar it brought to the party?  Marketing.

Engineering is table stakes – it has to be there.  Sales, I would argue, are equally table stakes.  Marketing is the great variable.  Marketing can jack a valuation much faster – and much higher – than any revenue number.  Marketing can cover bad engineering.  Marketing can drive sales – sales rarely drives marketing.

If you want more proof simply look at the low value exits that have occurred over the last decade.  I contend that LeftHand had as good as, if not better, stuff than EqualLogic – but HP bought them for $350M or so.  Why 1/4 when all else were on par?  You guessed it – marketing.  LH could have, and should have, positioned itself as a software company.  They were addicted to REVENUE, however, and it cost them.  They were under the absolutely incorrect illusion that they couldn’t go public without a bigger revenue number, and as such stayed firmly planted in the hell hole that is hardware.  Do you think HP valued them higher for being in hardware?  Of course not.  They penalized them.  LeftHand listened to their board and bankers – who still believe in the 1978 mantra of revenue as the only metric.  They didn’t focus on optimizing valuation – even though it’s how they make a living – because that would have meant going against the common wisdom – and it cost them.

True low value exits tend to happen when there is perhaps great engineering, and absolutely no marketing.  I made this point in my Israeli rant recently and it holds true here.  Great products are meaningless unless the world values them. How many times do we need to see a company with $50M invested sell for $10M or less before we figure this out?  The buyer saw value in the IP – but didn’t see any multiplier factor – a direct result of improper or non-existent marketing.

Final point – value isn’t transferable.  As soon as Data Domain and EqualLogic were integrated, their value shrank down to the levels of their acquirer, making a dollar a dollar once again.  Too many people forget that.  The only acquisition that makes sense is done based on the valuation of the acquirer – not the acquiree.  EMC did NOT become worth $2.4B more by buying Data Domain on day one – they were worth less.  As Data Domain adds revenue and earnings to the EMC pile, that value is multiplied back.

  • Share/Bookmark

ESG App on Apple Store

Tuesday, December 29th, 2009

How cool is that?

Go to the App Store and search ESG.

—-Update:  Try not to be confused about the other ESG – rap group Everyday Street Gangsta.  I don’t think they know jack about IT.

  • Share/Bookmark

Is There Any Intelligent Content on this Planet?

Monday, December 21st, 2009

My research director, John McKnight, has been making the point that eventually the content “crap factories” will drive people so crazy they will go back to paying for legitimate “thought,” analysis, and data.

Louis Gray recently blogged on the topic (quite brilliantly) and clarified some thoughts for me.

In short, the reason there is too much regurgitated crap out there is Google.  The pay per click advertising model, made so successful by the big G, is why there is such garf in the form of news or analysis.

The model is based on clicks, clicks are based on eyeballs, and eyeballs are based on popular topics.  So there are now companies out there that do NOTHING other than observe the most frequently searched terms, then find/write/hack up a piece of crap that contains all those terms so that you when  you click on that link, you’ll read said hunk of crap and hopefully click an ad for something else.

Advertisers want the eyeballs, so they don’t care if the content is garbage, stolen, or whatever.  They just want to make sure that if you surf Tiger/Porn Star/Nike you see a Reebok ad.  This is the game that we play.

The problem occurs in areas where the reader might be motivated by something other than a click to an advertiser – where they might actually want some news and/or analysis or god forbid, data.  The CCFs (content crap factories) don’t “do” analysis or data.  They regurgitate garf surfed from somewhere else.  One of the telling quotes for me mentioned in Louis’s blog was from Google’s DeWitt Clinton, who posted to Twitter, “Don’t worry. Save some time. Your story doesn’t need a shred of truth to it. It will be retweeted just the same.”  In which case, where does the responsibility lie?  There is none, so it lies nowhere.  More interesting perhaps is the thought about the inverse – instead of dumbing down to meet the masses, shouldn’t we really focus on smarting up to meet the right audience?

The current model is based on the lowest common denominator – getting as many of the unwashed to the site, with no regard nor care for who is clicking the ad.  Isn’t that ass backwards?  Wouldn’t Reebok pay MORE for me to click their ad than the crackhead down the road?  It seems to me, the advertising model should be flipped upside down.  We should focus on WHO the actual clicker is, not how many we get.  Charging the same for a click from a senior IT person as we do for a night student doing research is moronic – but that’s what we do.  So, until the motivation changes, we shouldn’t expect the crap factories to change what they are going – instead, it will accelerate.

So my question is:  In areas of non-TMZ hollywood stupidity – say, in IT, for example – is news, analysis, and data “worth” anything to the “individual” reader?

In order for the likes of ESG to monetize (a.k.a. stay in business) legitimate valuable content, we are forced to NOT put it all into the public domain.  We don’t support an advertising model.  So we live in a hybrid, where we attempt to put what we can into the public domain so that hopefully that public finds us credible and valuable, but respect the fact that commercial entities pay us for our content value – thus we’d be morons to bite the hand that feeds us and give it all away.

Should we consider a mass market advertising based approach?  Would that naturally force us to become a crap factory?  Should we go the other way and open up all our analysis and data to the individual for a fee?  Would anyone pay?

My fear is that as a society, we’ve again gone too far off intended course.  Unplanned use models for the net and social web have created a dumbed down society of content readers.  Do we need a tech version of TMZ?  Didn’t Byte & Switch prove that we don’t?  I’m all for entertainment, but is anyone really going to make a critical IT business decision based on the latest Lady Gaga goof up?  Lord, I hope not.

Everyone has a voice and an opinion.  The net makes the shy and meek into Superman.  People are brave in their online persona, but wouldn’t stand up and argue their point in a true public (i.e., actual) forum – mostly because they are totally full of shit.  They have no basis, no facts.  They spout crap because they can.  While I’m all for freedom of speech, I’d prefer to elect to walk into Hyde Park corner – not be fooled to listen because the speaker planted the proper keywords.  What if I went to listen only to find out that their dissertation is not actually on “why the war on drugs is an enormous mind control waste of time and money”, but instead that “the devil can be found in a Little Caesar’s pizza”.  I can’t get that time back.  Plus, I like that pizza.

Discuss.

  • Share/Bookmark

ZL vs. Gartner – Interesting at many levels

Thursday, December 17th, 2009

An e-mail archiving company, ZL Technologies, Inc., has sued, been dismissed, and re-sued Gartner – basically claiming that ZL’s placement in Gartner’s “Magic Quadrant” has caused the company damage – namely, that since Gartner places ZL in the “niche” spot, large customers don’t consider them, although the company contends their offerings are superior to those listed in a more prominent spot.  Gartner counter claims that the suit is without merit because the MQ represents opinion, and therefore there is no legal leg for ZL to stand on.

There are interesting things at play here.

First, the disclosures:

- ESG, the company I founded, is a Research, Analysis, and Strategy firm.  As such, in some ways we theoretically compete with Gartner.  In practicality, we don’t.

- A more honest disclosure of the above is that ESG doesn’t compete with Gartner, as we serve very different purposes.  A truly honest disclosure is that I am wildly impressed and completely jealous of Gartner’s ability to drive revenue the same way the mafia does – by veiled threat.  The difference is that the threat of the mafia (in a protection scheme) is physical while the threat of Gartner is market muscle/economic.  I would love to be that powerful – although if I were I’d like to believe I would not abuse the power – which in my opinion is the true crux of this issue.

- I have never met, nor heard of ZL Technologies until this lawsuit – although our analysts have.  I am told, that the company has some cool stuff, but is run by a lunatic.  I do not know if CEO Kon Leong is actually insane, or brilliant, or acting, or something else.  But I love the fact that he’s spending a lot of money on this issue keeping me entertained.

Here are the realities of the situation – IN MY OPINION (for those of you in the legal profession):

The laws of the land protect the opinion of people.  You can’t legislate what people think.  This, in essence, is Gartner’s defense, and ultimately why it will most likely prevail in this matter.

What is more interesting is that in its defense, Gartner exposes what everyone in the industry already knows, but are incapable of doing anything about – the fact that Gartner’s opinions are largely unqualified.  They market expertise and data – i.e., fact, but defend with opinion.

I can only speak about the Gartner I know – the IT Gartner that plays in the industry where I play.  For all I know the Gartner analysts, research, etc. in their other markets might be absolutely brilliant, and the value they bring to their customers and society in general unparalleled. Judging by what I see in their IT practice, I find it doubtful, but one never knows.

What Gartner is, but can never say, is a market “influencer,” to an envious degree.  What the Magic Quadrant is is an absolutely unscientific – but awesomely powerful – “tool” with no rhyme or reason, no scientific merit, and no disclosure.  It’s a self-interpretive slide that leaves the reader to judge the meaning of seemingly random dot placement.  Gartner does not defend (or contends it need not defend) the placement of those dots, for that placement is the opinion of the placee – namely the analyst responsible for said market analysis.

The problem, as I see it, is one for a much different court than a civil court.  It’s really about the FTC – because opinion isn’t the issue here.  I’m all for being able to toss your opinion around as one wishes.  The problem is one of deceptive business practices.

If you net out the whole issue it comes down to this:  Gartner has created a massively powerful perception of what I’ll term “qualified expertise” in the eyes of the mass market IT buyer (the people who write checks to vendors for billions of dollars).  Note:  They are absolutely brilliant at being able to accomplish this – and my guess is that at one time, that perception was merited.  As such, they wield incredible influence on companies that do business (or attempt to do so) within those market segments.  They have the power of business life and death sometimes.  They are the emperor – they can actually affect who wins, who loses, who lives, and who dies.

No rational person would look at the effective equivalent of a rorshach test (the MQ) and make any substantive decision based upon it, because there is no valid meaning in it.  It is subjective.  It, for all intents and purposes, may be thought provoking but it is by itself meaningless.

Further, if you were to look at an industry segmented Magic Quadrant that showed 10 companies or technologies with some clear winners and clear losers in an area that you were responsible for, you would put SOME level of merit into what the results/placement of the dots held – ranging from none to total belief.  The level of merit you place on that would depend on your TRUST of the expertise of those who present it.  If you have a trust relationship with a brand or a person then by default, the (perceived or real) credibility of that “data” or “input” is higher than those who have no such relationship.

For example, if you were investigating a major server purchase, you might very well look to see what Gartner says about the players in that market.  You would probably take a look at their MQ.  If that MQ showed vendor A up and to the right and vendor B down and to the left, you might reasonably assume that the brilliant experts at Gartner feel vendor A is superior to vendor B.  You might place a significant amount of credence on that assumption and it might truly influence your decision making.  If, however, you were to KNOW for a fact that the dots were placed by chimpanzees as part of a scientific experiment, you might not hold that “data” in such high esteem.  Since you don’t know that, you might be making a decision based solely on the perceptive expertise of the provider, with no actual insight into whether that perception is merited.  You simply ASSUME that the expertise behind the decision is valid and merits the result.

This, in my opinion (saying that a lot, aren’t I?) is the whole enchilada.  Is perpetuating and even actively attempting to foster the perception of expertise where little or none actually exists tantamount to fraud – or at least deceptive business practices?  I don’t know the law, but I know what a skunk smells like.

Allow me to say what most cannot or won’t – there is virtually no one within the IT industry itself that believes Gartner has any value outside of its market influence.  No one that I know pays Gartner for their expertise in any aspect of business.  There are no CEOs who call on Gartner for advice as to how to run their business.  There are no people in R&D calling on Gartner to determine what they should build into their next set of offerings.  There are no marketing big wigs calling Gartner to get help with messaging and positioning.  There are no market researchers who call on Gartner to sift through data for analysis as to why something will or will not happen, only that it did.  They use Gartner data if it makes them look good, and don’t if it doesn’t.  They use a quote if it makes them look good, and don’t if it doesn’t.  End of story.

Further, people in industry generally do not like dealing with Gartner – they don’t pay them for help, they pay them because they feel they have to.  They get no value generally, but the potential of garnering negative value is too great a risk for them to ignore.  In short, you pay Gartner to hope to end up in the top right of the quadrant.

I know this first hand – I was a customer of Gartner.  Virtually every ESG practitioner was also a customer of Gartner.  The stories are fairly universal – and they are the same stories told privately by most every executive of every vendor in the IT space.

This came from one of our analysts – and I think it’s a fair representation of many in our industry:

“In a prior vendor-side role, I was in ZL’s position – my company/product was consistently placed in the niche quadrant for a few years running without an interview or review by Gartner (no facts to base their opinion on).   I was able to prove (with a Gartner ombudsman) Gartner’s complete incompetence in constructing his (the analyst’s) MQ year-over-year as I had red-lined documents and an e-mail trail pointing out incorrect information in the previous years’ reports that he regurgitated year after year verbatim.  His response was that we should be happy we made the MQ at all (Gartner was giving us ink).  I lost all respect for Gartner after that.  The analyst (a very long time, very entrenched “name”) was “let go” soon after … no idea if it was related.  Still, the company I worked for had little recourse.  The worst that we could do was to drop our Gartner subscription.”

No one wants to pay protection money, yet they do.  Given a choice, they wouldn’t.  No one stands up to the mob, out of fear.

Allow me, at this point, to reaffirm my absolute unabashed jealousy of Gartner.  Who wouldn’t want to wield such power?   There are not many companies I can think of where the customer hates them, gets no value, and yet still gives them piles of money.  The only ones I can think of are monopolies – or governments.  Hmmm.  That is power.  Of course not all power is used for good – much is used for evil.

My problem with Gartner is simple – they simply do not live up to their perceptive level of expertise – at least in the markets where I live.  Their people are not practitioners of the art normally, which is why they can’t really bring any legitimate value to industry.  Their people simply have not stood in the shoes of the people who give them money.  That is not to say they don’t have very smart people – they do.  They also have a lot of complete and utter idiots.  The problem is that it’s very hard to tell where the “intelligence” comes from – unqualified idiot or brilliantly qualified person.

So the real question is,  if Gartner’s influence is based on an invalid perception of expertise, and Gartner knows it, does that equate to a deceptive business practice?  Since the result of this ends up in the case ZL is bringing – that Gartner is using an unqualified invalid perception of expertise to negatively influence the ability of ZL (and everyone else in that position) to conduct commerce.

What is the recourse for those affected by this practice?  Nothing really.  You could sue the mafia for shaking you down for protection money, but you would lose.  It’s your choice to give them your money.  You decide the value.  ZL is suing the mafia.  The judge will most likely say, sorry – you don’t have to pay them if you don’t want.  That’s the only recourse industry has – they can stop doing business with Gartner.  The reason they won’t is obvious – fear.  It’s the same reason they do business with them to begin with.

The really bad part of all of this is that Gartner doesn’t have to be doing things like this.  They could refill their ranks with qualified experts.  They could add logic, reason, and disclosures to their MQ choices.  They could legitimize themselves – and then they would deserve the influence they command.

The reality is that they probably won’t – and the reason why is simple: money.  They are public.  Idiots are cheaper than experts.  Plus, they don’t have to.  They are protected as long as their influence on the buyers exists.  There is no incentive for them to do anything except propagate the myth of expertise.  People are going to pay them because they don’t want a “labor dispute.”  It’s a cost of doing business.  Why add value if it doesn’t matter?  The only way this “family” is broken up is either through a massive industrial backlash (i.e., all the big guys band together and publicly call Gartner out) or a government intervention.  Otherwise, I’m afraid ZL and all the rest are hosed.

The only way ZL wins is if someone with enormous pockets, who cares less about Gartner, and who themselves wield huge power and influence in the market decide to join the party.  I’m thinking Larry Ellison would be perfect for this role.  Oracle and ZL have a relationship currently.  That would make things really interesting.

  • Share/Bookmark

Fail Factors – Why Startups Die: The Israeli Illusion

Wednesday, December 9th, 2009

This week, the rumor mill has Israeli scale-out file system/NAS company Exanet about to shut down after many years of struggling and over $70 million invested.  One of my favorite technology companies of the last ten years was another Israeli entity, Cloverleaf, that has either shuttered or is in some other industry now.  These, and many others, had really, really good technologies – but they failed.  Why?  Because really, really good technology without really, really deep understanding of market realities inevitably ends in either death or a narrow escape.  It almost never ends in glorious victory.

I love the Israelis.  As a people, as a culture, and certainly as an engineering powerhouse.  I love their will.  I love their passion.  I love that they can be surrounded (literally) by the worst of human competitors, and continue to smile.  I’ve seen dozens, if not hundreds, of Israeli tech startups over the last ten years.  They tend to follow one of two paths.  The first is where they struggle to embrace the realities of the global markets (i.e. the U.S.) and go the way of Exanet.  The second, the “victorious” case, is where they embrace those realities to varying degrees and exit – with a small technology valuation selling themselves to a bigger fish – typically in the $40-150M range.  Path two is far better than path one, but rarely do you see these types of entities end up with home run kind of exits (not that I’m actually saying 40M bucks isn’t any good, but it’s all relative.  I’d shoot you for $40M, no question).

The problem in either outcome tends to emanate from the same place: the belief that a company in IT/Tech over the last 20 years can be truly run from Israel.  They can’t.  I am an unabashed fan of all things Israel – but I’m a realist as well.  You can make great things in Israel.  You can sell to your army buddies in Israel.  You can raise money in Israel.  You can hire loyalists who will work like dogs and build stellar products in Israel.  But you can’t grow a big IT/Tech company of relevance in Israel (with very few notable exceptions, of course).

If you want to be in the IT space, like it or not, you need to be a U.S. company.  That doesn’t mean you can’t start in other places.  It doesn’t mean you can’t ship your winnings back to other places. It doesn’t mean you can’t develop in other places or sell in other places – it means that if you want to be a integral part of the “game” you have to play it where the others do and unfortunately, that’s here in the good old U.S.A.

Non-US tech firms tend to be ignorant to the ways in which business in the U.S. is really done – much in the same way that U.S. companies are often moronic in the way they assume business will be done internationally.  The difference is that if you can conquer the U.S. market, you can screw up internationally and still make a giant pile of dough.  The reverse is simply not true.  (I’m not making value judgments here – I’m simply stating facts).

There are tons of companies that have had huge financial success in the U.S. – to the tune of billions of dollars – that are complete and utter idiots when it comes to their international operations – but who cares?  They already cashed the checks.  Big piles of dough help you get over your inadequacies or failures in “foreign” markets.  It’s easy for a U.S. CEO to think “those French, they don’t know anything about how to conduct business.”  The fact that it’s really the U.S. CEO that has no idea how to conduct business in France (or Asia, or New Zealand, etc.) is easily dismissed as the CEO steps off of his Learjet.  Unfortunately, the reverse is seldom true.

Companies that think too provincially tend to believe that what they need to do is:

  1. build the best gizmo ever (regardless of whether or not any market demands such a gizmo)
  2. go show the gizmo to the power brokers, namely the major US OEMs
  3. wait for the bidding war to ensue

I can’t count how many pitches I’ve heard over the years that invariably include the statement, “and then we’ll get an OEM deal with Dell, unless HP grabs it first.”  When I explain to them that OEMs such as Dell are pitched about 1,000 deals a year, look more closely at 100, look very close at 10, and end up doing a deal with 1,they think I’m crazy.  ”We’ll be the one then, our stuff is great.”  Ugh.

They tend to open up U.S. operations as a sales and systems engineering (support) organization – usually with far too few qualified people and a grossly underestimated set of assumptions on how long, how hard, and how costly mercenary selling efforts are.  Therefore, they put a team in NY (even though the LAST people on the planet that are going to buy anything from a crazy Israeli startup are in NY usually), a team in San Francisco, and then wait for the orders to roll in.  Sometimes they hire a U.S. sales head, who more often than not is completely the wrong person, who then goes and hires a bunch of sales guys without a clue as to what they should be selling to whom, and end up creating nightmare support and engineering problems back in Israel.  The engineers think the Americans are morons and the Americans think the Israelis can’t build stuff that works.  It’s a no win situation – and both are at fault.

Eventually, after these efforts prove futile, those with the ability to raise more capital realize they can’t commute to the U.S. and expect to get anywhere.  They need to be here.  Worse yet, they need to open up their minds, wallets, and let down their guard.  They need to invite non-Israelis to the party.  Many times, the Israeli founder will relocate  to the U.S. – but that almost NEVER works.  You can take the business person out of Israel, but you can’t take the Israeli out of the business person.  Israelis are strong willed people who tend to attempt to inflict their will on the U.S. business community.  Many actually can do 90% of the jobs inside a company better than each of the individuals they hire – but they can’t do them at the same time.  Bad idea.  The best case is when that founder comes to the U.S. – not to set up Haifa west – but instead to help hire the right U.S. CEO, who needs to hire the right U.S. marketing chief (a more difficult and more important hire than the CEO most of the time, in my humble opinion) and the right sales head.  They need to bring in U.S. money most likely (although there are tons of quasi-Israeli/U.S. money companies).

Startups in general face a brutal maturity ritual, no matter where they are from – the transition from what they “were” to what they need to become.  Changes in people, culture, and process are hard enough in the same city and same building where you started – they are brutally hard when you add completely different cultures and 9,000 miles.

Israelis in general are a pragmatic people.  They believe that since their stuff is the best, that is enough.  I know differently.  One of the most hated things in the life of an Israeli cum U.S. tech company is marketing. Engineering is art and science.  Marketing is bullshit.  Alas, while truth and engineering creates value, bullshit jacks that value into the stratosphere.  Call me crazy, but I’d rather be full of bull if it means a billion versus a million.  If a company is not spending marketing dollars on par with engineering investments, they are never going to optimize their value. Sad perhaps, but true nonetheless.  I can prove of which I speak, lest you don’t believe me.

There are some fantastic success stories that have come out of Israel, and there will be more.  But history has taught us that life is not fair, and business even less so.  For every Checkpoint home run there are handful of doubles (XIV), a dozen small wins (Files-X, Diligent, Kashya), a hundred waiting and hoping (Mellanox, Voltaire), and a thousand left for dead.  The biggest home runs of all have come with the combination of Israeli skills and US based companies – including EMC, IBM, Microsoft, and others.

The odds improve dramatically the earlier the company faces reality, opens up (in earnest) in the U.S., and spends the right amount of effort truly understanding the market dynamics at play.

  • Share/Bookmark

Use IT to pick stocks

Thursday, December 3rd, 2009

Terri McClure wrote an excellent blog yesterday regarding the fact that “IT savvy” companies are 21% more profitable than others.

That got me thinking – if it’s true, and it sure seems logical that it is, then how long will it take portfolio managers to  start going right into IT to look for these long term indicators?  Bad IT = bad company most of the time, and bad companies tend to be good stocks to short.  The opposite is probably true as well.  If you can uncover an excellent IT organization, you most likely have stumbled upon an excellent organization in general.  If you compare that company with its competitors, and find the competition is weak in IT, you probably have a stock winner.

I’m going to think more about this – it’s a very interesting metric that could be of value to my friends in IT as a way to elevate their strategic value inside their organizations.

  • Share/Bookmark

Fail Factors – Why Startups Die – The Zealot

Wednesday, December 2nd, 2009

I have 6 great books that I’ll most likely never write.   I’m facing my own laziness.

One of my many business books is about why startups fail.  Since I’ll probably never write that one either, I figured I’d start forcing myself to do it the lazy way – via this blog.

Here’s the poop:  Over the last 10+ years in this business, I’ve tracked (some much more closely than others) about 1,000 companies.  Most of those were startups.  Most of those are gone.  Prior to ESG, I spent the previous 12+ years in various companies as an employee and as a founder.  Some of the places I’ve worked have hit spectacular heights (EMC) while others have blandly moved along and even more have died.

There are 1000 books on how companies succeed and how they fail.  There are management books on every nook and cranny, but I haven’t found many that really help the entrepreneur.  I think Blue Ocean Strategy and Crossing the Chasm are fantastic – mostly because they are focused on some practical realities that, once you read, they make you say “duh, that makes sense.”  That’s useful.

I’m not that smart, but I am observant (in business, not in anything relevant to my wife – I’m blind and clueless in most things in that regard).  I’m also fortunate enough to have piles of data.  You don’t have to be an idiot savant to pattern match if you have the right data.

So, I’m going to start spitting out (in no specific order) things that, while obvious to some, cause stupendous problems for many.  I would love your commentary, thoughts, and, by all means – your ideas on other things that make perfectly well intended startups go the way of the dodo.

Fail Factor #1 – Zealotry

A zealot is someone who believes so strongly in what it is they are doing that it is all consuming for them, and it becomes contagious.  In a world dominated by followers, a zealot stands out.  Anyone who believes anything so strongly will stand apart from the wishy washy masses – be they religious, political, technological, or any other kind of  zealot.

When political or religious, society can easily dismiss the zealot as a radical or lunatic.  When the zealot lives in technology, they get funded.

Often, it takes the perserverence and unfettered self-belief of a zealot to get a startup off the ground and funded. Sometimes, the zealot can use their uncompromising belief in themselves or their purpose to lift their organizations to huge heights, but more often than not, it is that very same zealotry that kills them.

I’m a huge fan of the entrepreneur, inventor, developer, etc. having absolute belief in what they are doing.  It’s been rare in my experience where a true startup zealot goes unfunded. It happens, but usually because of extreme unforeseen environmental conditions (like when the global economy melts down and VC’s have lost 90% of ther portfolio value).  So the positive lesson here is that zealots get funded.  If you want money, best to rise above the unwashed masses, be noticed, and let your beliefs leak out of your pores in front of wishy-washy lemming VCs with piles of dough.

History is littered with companies with good ideas, perhaps even great ideas, and the ability to execute on those ideas – that don’t get funded.  Zealotry is the X-factor when it comes to getting a startup funded.  If you have it, your odds are much higher than if you don’t, simple as that.  Zealotry works when raising money – but not when growing and sustaining a company.

Entrepreneurs often confuse raising money from VCs with absolute validation that they are right.  That is a fatal mistake.  VCs are gamblers – if they knew you were right, they would join the company.  They don’t know if you are right, so they spread some dough around to cover the board.  Getting VC money means you excited them.  You excited them because you are a zealot.  It has NOTHING to do with being right.

A VC wants the return that happens when a company succeeds – but they make bets on zealots.  The zealot uses the funding success as proof that they are right – often closing whatever small crack existed for the zealot to accept external inputs and change.  Bad recipe.

For those who do get funded, the zealot can help motivate and carry a company early on.  They can inspire and motivate to impossible levels.  People believe in others who believe in something so strongly that they can’t conceive of any way that their thinking can possibly be wrong.

That’s what kills them.  By their very nature, the thing that for some period makes a zealot successful, ultimately leads to their demise.

Zealots don’t leave wiggle room.  Their way is the only way.  They firmly believe (and by default make everyone around them believe) that whatever thing they have in their brain is the only possible way to succeed.  While they may be right, they are blind.  They are blind to their surroundings – they are blind to change.  The zealot succeeds by never changing their approach or their mind – which is also why they fail.

The zealot is so immersed in the belief that they are right that they can’t adapt to situational change.  In a static world, the zealot would reign forever.  In a dynamic world, the zealot will implode – it’s only a matter of time.

You can start a business with zealotry, but you can’t sustain one.  Passion yes, zealotry no.  Passion leaves wiggle room to adapt – zealotry leaves none.  Even arrogance leaves cracks.  You can be an arrogant jerk, but that doesn’t mean you necessarily actually BELIEVE your own bullshit.  The zealot believes.  The zealot knows.

Have you noticed that many of the stupidly funded companies – the ones that raised $100M bucks or so – are the ones with truly excellent zealots?  You can’t raise that kind of money without having one.  Have you also noticed that they almost always are written off for IP table scraps?  Same reason.  Remember Cereva? Incipient? Scale-8? Nishan? Giant Loop?

Even in well oiled successful machines, the zealot will eventually crumble under the weight of their own beliefs.  Moshe Yanai, one of the most brilliant minds ever in the IT business, fathered the Symmetrix at EMC.  It was wildly successful for many years (still is).  He was so consumed with the Symm, that anything that wasn’t a Symm was somehow bad.  If Joe Tucci didn’t eliminate Moshe, EMC would never have sold any CLARiiON – now a huge piece of their business.  The zealot wants to change the world to sustain their beliefs.  The truly smart business person adapts their actions (and sometimes their beliefs) to sustain their world.

The moral?  Believe in yourself 99%.  Believe in your mission 99%.  Always leave yourself 1% open to change. The zealot is rarely, if ever, successful forever.  The passionate person able to adapt to new realities – even when they fly in the face of what they believe – is the sustainable mental model necessary for long-term success.

  • Share/Bookmark

Thanksgiving thoughts

Wednesday, November 25th, 2009

Thanksgiving is my favorite holiday.  Thanksgiving is to an eating, drinking, napping, and football fan what Christmas is to kids – magical and eventually messy and uncomfortable.

The same is true in the wild, wacky world of IT.

IT can be the most boring industry in the world for months on end and then out of nowhere, it gives us things that are stunningly shocking, interesting, and intellectually stimulating.  It gives moments of joy, confusion, and staggering stupidity.

I’m thankful for the HP vs. Cisco war that will keep us interested from every perspective for at least the next two years.  This is as big as it gets in terms of ramifications.  I don’t know how it will all end up two years from now, but I can guarantee it will leave carnage, blood money, and business violence.  It will be way cool.

I’m thankful for VCE, speaking of Cisco, for putting together the super band – and waking up all others to the power of giants coming together for the common good – their own common good, of course.

I’m thankful for HP hiring Dave Donatelli and causing a little excitement and a whole bunch of “wait and see” what’s next.

I’m thankful for really great companies that continue to evolve and remain really great companies.  You can hate EMC the way most non-New Englanders hate Tom Brady (or the way New Englanders hate Derek Jeter) – but you are an idiot if you don’t respect their abilities, results, and the way they play their games.  Same for NetApp and Oracle and HP.

I’m thankful that Alan Atkinson is shaking things up at Xiotech.  They were starting to get boring (again).

I’m disappointed in IBM and Pillar.  IBM, because they could be the ones kicking butt and dictating the game, but they are sitting on the sidelines and that bums me out.  Pillar because they have Larry, Larry’s outrageous dough, and they still seem stuck in neutral.  They should be much further along.  I’m not that smart, but if I had Larry’s dough, I’d own a market by now (or maybe a country).  I’m disappointed in Egenera too.  I think they had something but have waited too long.

I’m thankful and truly awe inspired by Data Domain – not just for what they were able to pull off, but the way that they have kept it going (accelerated, truth be told) inside of EMC.  I’m also tremendously impressed at how EMC has made it work.  I would not have put money on it, but I was wrong.  I’m thankful that this deal was able to shine a spotlight on the fact that we are morons – that we really shouldn’t keep 11 billion copies of the same video of Brittany Spears getting out of a limo.  I’m hopeful that 2010 will show us how to continue that thought – into primary capacity.  I’m thankful Ed Walsh is now running Storewize as he always ends up doing something interesting.  I’d be lying if I didn’t mention that I’m disappointed with Ocarina thus far.  It seems they have something, but are forcing me to figure out what it is – and I’m too lazy for that.

I’m thankful that Dell has decided to move out of the small company, big volume business and step up their game.  I like when there are more giants making things interesting globally.

I’m thankful that it now appears that our industry will continue on, and not die in the face of the global economic meltdown.  I’m also thankful that the meltdown has forced us to become better at what we do.  Sometimes you need a slap in the face or you keep on doing bad things – like wearing a mullet or keeping that ponytail that makes you look like the comic store guy in the Simpsons.

People should be uncomfortable sometimes.  Complacency sucks.  That’s why I overeat to such a reckless degree on Thanksgiving.  I don’t want to be complacent.  Plus, it gives me an excuse to nap.  My kids will shove forks in their eyes to avoid napping, but I’d pay money.  Kids are nuts.

I’m thankful for the truly wonderful people I’ve come to know in this business.  I’m also disappointed that there are still too many jackasses in the world.

I’m thankful that there still good, decent human beings around.  Specifically, I’m calling out my little sister, Kristen, who with two boys already (8, 6) is adopting my new niece, Samantha (14-20 months – no one really knows), from Ethiopia.  We hope she’s here by Christmas.

Have a nice weekend.

  • Share/Bookmark

The Politics of (Dirty) Dancing – HP, Cisco, and EMC

Thursday, November 19th, 2009

It’s not what you say, it’s who you are standing next to when you say it.  EMC and Cisco are dance partners – and everyone is talking about it.  HP decided they were tired of Cisco being the homecoming king and went out and bought 3Com – just to take on the king.  It’s sort of like Karate Kid when the bad ass got taken down by the weak kid.  No offense to HP with a Ralph Macchio reference, of course, and no, I’m not going to succumb to the obvious “wax on, wax off” reference either.

Eventually the prom king and queen end up old and lame, don’t they?  Isn’t that what happened in “Back to the Future”?

HP just picked a fight with the big jock Cisco, and now everyone is going to the parking lot to see what’s going to happen.  There is no romance involved, as HP doesn’t want Cisco’s girl (sorry EMC/VMware), it’s more about money, pride – and maybe a degree of monarchy toppling.

As in the movies, a lot of people who are used to the king being the king assume the challenger will get their butt kicked and that tomorrow the king will be back giving wedgies in the hallway.  Meanwhile, there are a ton of supporters for the challenger that have heretofore been too afraid to show that support – lest they become a wedgie recipient.

After HP gets their hands on the 3Com/H3C stuff in earnest, it will be fantastic to see if the silent lower castes step up to be heard.

Cisco is in a pickle, me thinks.  As magnificent a company as they are, they find themselves a bit boxed in by their own success.  They have the unfortunate disadvantage of being so wonderfully predictable, that Wall St. has built value models that aren’t very flexible.  Cisco makes 65% gross margins – which is both awe inspiring and terrifying.  It has been possible because Cisco is one of the greatest run companies in history.  It has been sustainable because as a brilliantly run company, they have effectively controlled the market.  You can charge what you want if you are the only game in town.  When the house is on fire, you don’t quibble on price with the guy who owns the water supply.  You might not like it, but what are you going to do?  There is only so much beer one can drink.

Up until now, Cisco has been able to effectively control their market, and thus been able to sustain 65% margins.  The margin knob is a violence inducing knob.  People kill to turn it up, and jump off buildings when it turns down.  Enter Wall St.

HP, through H3C, now has a set of core switching products equal to, or better than, Cisco’s stuff.  While I don’t expect people to start tossing  perfectly good Cisco gear out their windows, a company like HP is going to get the ear of the Cisco buyer.  Once they have that ear, HP is going to tell those buyers the following:

“Cisco is great (they won’t mean it).  We have these products that are better – and they are 40% less money.  We are HP – you might have heard of us.  All we want is to be your second supplier – just give us a taste, because if nothing else, it will help you keep Cisco honest.”

Customers will say, “OK”.  They will give HP a taste.  They will spend 5%, then 10%, then more on the HP stuff.  Then the fun will begin.

If the stuff works as I believe it does, the next deal will get ugly for Cisco.  Once HP proves its stuff is up to snuff, Cisco will have to justify why they have a 40% price premium – which they won’t be able to do.  Cisco doesn’t have the product portfolio breadth that HP has, so it’s not like they can bury margin in one place and make up for it elsewhere – like in servers!  That will leave Cisco with a bad decision – either drop price which means cut margin, or lose share.  If Cisco loses 10% margin, it will turn into BILLIONS of dollars in cap value losses.  If they lose 10% share, it will be a bloodbath.

HP, on the other hand, can pull this off because of the following:

  1. They already have incurred the cost of sale – they are already there.  They have to add true core data center networking expertise, but they don’t have to build a “company.”  They have a trust brand to die for – they will get the benefit of the doubt.
  2. HP makes 12-22% margins – so even selling at 40%+ less than Cisco, the HP margins realized on this kind of stuff will be 35-50% – 2-4X their average.  I’m no math wiz, but I see a distinct advantage here.

So will everyone drop their Cisco dance partner?  No, of course not, but there is a new kid in town and he doesn’t appear intimidated by the king.

See you after school.

  • Share/Bookmark

Switch to our mobile site